

MIMESIS AS ART – Applications in Musical Heuristics

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Introduction

The first part of this article is based on an analysis of three great philosophers in regard to mimesis. For Plato, in *The Republic*, mimesis is detrimental to the education of the youth, and therefore it is necessary to proscribe it; in *The Timaeus*, on the contrary, Plato presents the mimesis of the world of ideas and its reflection in the sensitive reality as the motor energy of the universe.

It is Aristotle who develops the subjectivation of the notion, establishing in his *Poetics* the basis of a natural mimesis as an innate essential trend in the learning process. In it, the similarity to the model of the work necessarily implies the elaboration work of the artist.

In his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Hegel takes a step back, renouncing subjectivation and reconsidering mimesis as an unnecessary and superfluous copy.

Once this discussion has been set out, we will take a stand on Aristotle's interpretation, by which mimesis and art are ultimately synonymous; in other words, mimesis is one way, but of course not the only one, of carrying out the artist's creative process from the development of the model. This vision is the means that will allow us to abandon speculative analysis to enter the field of practice.

Practice is the subject of the second part of the article. A change of method is set, first presenting the musicological discipline Musical Heuristics and then exposing one of its main goals: the mimesis applied to the perceptive reconstruction of contemporary works.

FIRST PART:
THE DISCUSSION ON MIMESIS

Plato -

I - Mimesis in *the Republic*

From the point of view of art, Plato is nostalgic for an era that had already ceased to exist when he was born. His life takes place in a time where the archaic uses and customs have already evolved. At the time when he lived, (Plato was probably born in 428 B.C., a year before Pericles' death) architects, sculptors, playwrights, philosophers, musicians, painters had just carried out in Athens a revolution of unprecedented magnitude in the history of art, in what is called today *the golden age of Pericles*(about thirty years of cultural supremacy of Athens). There are two main reasons for this unprecedented flourishing: first, the historical resonance of Athens' victory in the third Greco-Persian War. From then on, the Greeks assumed the military and maritime hegemony of their territories. It is at this moment that the conception of life changes radically for the West. Getting rid of the doctrine of circular time, of the continuous cycle of births and deaths, of the eternal return and fatality of destiny, the Greeks impose their paradigm of linearity of time, of radical finiteness of life and, ultimately, of freedom and responsibility of choices.¹

Secondly, we find a much less glorious explanation for this golden age: to realise his cultural miracle, Pericles performs what we would today call *a large-scale embezzlement*. He uses funds from the Delos League, which Greek cities regularly provided in prevention of a new attack by the Persians, to finance the reconstruction of the Acropolis in Athens, in ruins since the invasion of the Second Persian War. An amazing marble city was born, whose monumental architectural works include the Parthenon, the Propylaea, the Erechtheion... In addition, Pericles had the Temple of Zeus at Olympia and the Temple of Apollo at Delphi rebuilt outside of Athens. To carry out these monumental works

¹ Greeks are free and alone; their redemption of their soul is not assured by any moral conduct. But they accept their finite condition with arrogance: they will come to disdain the immortality that the gods offer them (at a crucial moment in the Odyssey, Ulysses rejects the immortality offered him by Circe, despite having heard in the depths of Hades the lamentations of his comrades-in-arms, who fell during the Trojan War).

Pericles had the intelligence to constitute a team, joining the effort of the best architects of the time.

The sculptors accompany this series of architectural wonders: the names of Phidias, (author of the gigantic marble statues of Athena at the Parthenon and of Zeus at Olympia, considered one of the seven wonders of the ancient world), Myron (sculptor of the famous Discobolus), Praxiteles (sculptor of the statues of Artemis, Hermes and the infant Dionysus) and Scopas (called to collaborate in the decoration of the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus in Asia Minor), are the most well-known. Together with the building reconstruction, the artists as a whole contributed to make the transition between an archaic and schematic art, based on the myths that were re-actualized in the real events, and an art where the artist's subjectivism appears, giving the gods a human form, or directly representing the real experience without mediations or intermediary symbols.²

In this historical transition, Plato's thought is articulated. His philosophy advocates the existence of the *Topus Uranus* or world of Ideas, timeless and eternal, of which reality is only a deceptive and imperfect vision. Nothing better than the famous Allegory of the Cave (*The Republic*, book VII) to illustrate this: the shadows projected over the walls of the cave were not the true forms of reality; but the prisoners, born in the cave, assumed that this was the reality and no other.

The Republic defends tradition and respect for uses and customs in education and training, always keeping in mind that reality is a sensitive and imperfect copy of an intelligible and perfect world. This has direct consequences on arts; since Ideas can be neither changed nor improved, the work of the artist consists on variations of immemorial canons without introducing changes in forms. The arts must play a fundamental role in the formation of youth. This starting point is essential to understanding *the Republic*: the only arts authorized will be those that have already proven their pedagogical importance for a harmonious and balanced education, eliminating any superfluous art or simply imitation of a reality that, in turn, is only a reflection of the world of ideas.

² It is interesting to note that Greek theatre follows step by step this transition: Aeschylus, born a century before the golden age of Pericles, is still archaic, with the hieratic representation of the gods and mythical heroes; the characters are humanised by Sophocles (Aristotle's favourite dramaturge) and gain in subjectivity by Euripides.

"In short, it is the duty of city rulers to resist all surreptitious corruption. Their vigilance will prevent innovations in terms of gymnastics and music. Let everything remain in its place. This is where their role as guardians will come into play. They will be concerned when they hear these verses: "There is a song that has a sovereign effect on the minds of men, the one in which the singers perform it in a new way" (Quotation from The Odyssey, I, 351-352.) They will fear that the poet's words "in a new way," which refer to the content of the sung poems, will be interpreted as if they were alluding to a new way of singing. [...] A revolutionary musical genre must be outlawed because it puts the entire system at risk. Nothing can be altered in the musical modes without changing the fundamental laws of the city [...]."³

Thus, what he considers to be the artifice of imitation or simulacrum is severely criticized. As in the previous citation, Homer is the target of his criticism:

(Socrates in dialogue with Adeimantus)

"Tell me, you know by heart the principle of the Iliad: Chryses prays to Agamemnon to give him back his daughter; Agamemnon gets angry, and Chryses, who fails to obtain his request, invokes the gods against the Achaeans.

...] You know, then, that till these verses, [...] it is the poet (Homer) who speaks, and he does not try to make us imagine that he is someone else; but then *he begins to speak as if he were Chryses himself; he tries to give us the impression, as far as possible, that it is no longer Homer who speaks, but the priest...*

In general, it is in this second style that the adventures in Ilion, or Ithaca, or the entire Odyssey took place."⁴

In order to generalize Plato's criticism, the artist would produce, through simulation or lie, a form of illusion that would cause confusion

³« Bref, le devoir s'impose aux responsables de la cité, de résister à toute corruption subrepticte. Leur vigilance évitera les innovations en matière de gymnase et de musique. Que tout y reste en place. C'est là que jouera d'abord leur fonction de gardiens. Ils vont s'inquiéter à l'audition de ces vers,

"Il est un chant qui produit un effet souverain sur l'esprit des hommes, celui que les chanteurs font courir tout neuf autour d'eux." (Odyssée, I, 351-352)

Ils redouteront qu'on interprète le mot du poète "tout neuf" qui désigne simplement ici le contenu des poèmes chantés, comme s'il désignait une nouvelle façon de chanter ; ils redouteront qu'on aille y applaudir. Or, il n'a pas lieu d'applaudir ou d'acquiescer. Un genre révolutionnaire en musique est à proscrire, parce qu'il fait courir un risque à tout le système. On ne saurait bouger quelque chose dans les modes musicaux sans bouger les lois fondamentales de la cité [...]. »

PLATON, *La république*, translated by Jacques Cazeaux, le Livre de Poche, Librairie Générale Française, 1995 for the french translation, Book 3, Primer Cuadro, escena 3, p. 424.

⁴(Socrate en dialogue avec Adimante)

« Dis-moi, tu sais par cœur le début de l'Iliade : Chrysès prie Agamemnon de lui rendre sa fille ; Agamemnon se met en colère, et Chrysès, qui a donc échoué, invoque le Dieu contre les Achéens.

[...] Tu sais donc que jusqu'à ces vers [...] c'est le Poète qui parle, et il ne cherche pas à nous faire imaginer que c'est un autre ; mais ensuite, *il se met à parler comme s'il était lui-même Chrysès : il essaie de nous donner autant que possible l'impression que ce n'est plus Homère qui parle, mais ce prêtre [...].* Globalement, c'est dans ce second style que se sont développées les aventures ayant pour théâtre Ilion, ou Ithaque, l'Odyssée tout entière." »

between reality and fiction, thus generating real emotional reactions in response to illusory situations and behaviours. This criticism also refers to painters, as shown in the parable of the three beds:

“There is a triple reality of the bed in question... The painter, the craftsman, God: there are three overlapping purposes, three categories of beds”.⁵

Already the carpenter's bed is a representation of the bed as an idea. The painter's bed is a simulation, since it is a representation of a representation. And this also applies to plays:

“So it will be the same with the tragic author, since he is an imitator.”⁶

Mimesis would thus produce a pernicious illusion of the world through its simulations and illusory reflections of reality:

“An easy procedure, very used, fast, will put you in the role of this craftsman (the painter, NB.), very fast even: if you take a mirror and transport it in all directions, you will have quickly manufactured the sun and the celestial objects, just as fast the earth, just as fast yourself among the living beings, and the furniture, the plants, and this universe we have just evoked”.⁷

Plato's Republic unequivocally positions itself as a defender of Truth and Justice. There is no room in it for the plausible, the convincing. The mimesis of the artist reproduces the image of an image, and therefore it can be concluded,

“[...] that the imitator has only an insignificant knowledge of the things he imitates, and that imitation is only a joke unworthy of serious people [...].”⁸

⁵ «Il y a une triple réalité du lit en cause [...] Le peintre, le fabricant de lits, Dieu, voilà trois préposés, aux trois catégories de lit.»

Ibid., Épilogue, « L'imitation, simulacre du réel » (Livre X, § 597), p. 443.

⁶ « Il ira donc de même de l'auteur tragique, puisque c'est un imitateur »
PLATON, *La république*, op. cit., p. 444.

⁷ « Un procédé facile, très employé, rapide, te mettra dans le rôle de cet artisan (le peintre, NB.), très rapide même : si tu veux bien prendre un miroir et le promener dans tous les sens, tu auras vite fabriqué le soleil et les objets célestes, tout aussi vite la terre, tout aussi vite toi-même parmi les vivants, et le mobilier, les plantes, cet univers qu'on vient d'évoquer. »

Ibid., p. 442.

⁸ « [...] que l'imitateur n'a qu'une connaissance insignifiante des choses qu'il imite, et que l'imitation n'est qu'un badinage indigne des gens sérieux [...] »

PLATON, *République*, Translation by E. Chambray, éditions Les Belles Lettres, 5^e édition, Paris, 1961, (Livre X, § 602), p. 452.

Mimetic immersion

Plato had the merit of discovering a procedure proper to art, the mimetic immersion⁹ that the artist and the public can experience in their relationship with the work. Let's go back to the example taken from the Iliad: in the first moment, Homer speaks on behalf of Chryses, telling how he prostrates himself before Agamemnon to ask for his grace. This is followed by a moment of great emotion in the story, a consequence of the humiliation of the old priest and the angry rejection of Agamemnon. From that moment on, the priest invokes the gods and curses the Achaeans for the affront he has to endure. It is from this moment on that history changes and Homer begins to speak in the first person, taking the place of Chryses.

In the mimetic immersion there is, therefore, a first moment of preparation, in which the difference between the model and his representation is maintained. We are explicitly in the metaphor: the model and its representation remain two autonomous entities with perfectly defined limits.

Then there is a trigger that will produce the immersion, which in this case is the emotion that awakens the passion of the protagonists. It is this emotion that makes the mediation of the representation disappear. The metaphorical distance is suppressed: the "a as if it were b" vanishes leaving in its place "a = b". This is ultimately what Plato fears most: a pernicious lure that, according to him, confuses reality with fiction, since imitation has the power to mobilize real feelings.

But Plato is wrong when he believes that Homer is a simulator: in fact, Homer does not pretend to be Chryses. His empathy with the dramatic situation leads him *to be* and, at the same time, *not to be* his character. Even before the reader, Homer is the first to experience the effect of mimetic immersion, caught by the emotion of his own story. Even before what will be called much later with Kant *subjective universality* or *intersubjectivity* is theorized, Homer's own immersion in fiction is the prerequisite for the immersion of the audience, since Homer is not simply the poet, but also the first recipient of his work. What happens to him happens to everyone. He is certainly a privileged reader, but he is also, in a sense, like all the others. What Homer feels,

⁹ Terminology borrowed from Jean-Marie SCHAEFFER's book *Pourquoi la fiction ? (Why Fiction?)* Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1999. Regarding mimetic immersion, see chapter II « Mimesis : imiter, feindre, représenter et connaître » ("Mimesis : imitate, pretend, represent and know"), p. 61–132.

above all, is the trigger of the feelings that the public will experience when reading his works.

This is the essence of artistic activity: to be able to move insensitively from a metaphor to a personification, from a conscious and voluntary sense of representation to an unconscious and involuntary sense of appropriation. The Greek tragedies are a good example of these two modes, which we can characterize as representative and apprehensive of the work. The first moment is given by the chanted narration of the choreographers, through which the audience becomes aware of the plot. In the second moment the *pathos* of the theatrical representation of the events will produce the identification of the public with the characters.

The mimetic immersion is the cause of a new aesthetic situation in the arts. Its appearance in the work coincides with the passage from schematic to representational art, or, to use Hegel's terminology that we will analyse later on, from symbolic art to classical art. In the space of a century this transformation takes place, which is particularly notable in the field of the plastic arts.

Plato, who witnessed the birth of classical art, does not understand what is happening with this new expression that is strongly rooted in mimesis. His comparison between the work of artists and the reflections of a mirror, cited above, shows a fundamental misunderstanding about the creative process. The mirror in which the artist reflects the world is himself; a literal imitation without the intervention of the artist would be unthinkable. Even when he sets out to faithfully imitate nature, he transforms it, simply by the fact of his existence.

II - Mimesis in *the Timaeus*

In the twilight of his life, Plato writes *The Timaeus*, a dialogue involving the main characters of Socrates, Critias, Hermocrates and Timaeus. Plato himself describes this work as a plausible myth about the origin of the universe, man and society. In the fiction of the story, this dialogue is presented as a continuation of *the Republic*:

Socrates –“One, two, three, but our fourth, my dear Timaeus, who was in the group of my guests at yesterday's banquet and who is one of those who invited me to this banquet today, where is he?”¹⁰¹¹

¹⁰Socrate –« Un deux, trois, mais notre quatrième, mon cher Timée, celui qui faisait partie du groupe de ceux que j'avais invités au banquet que j'ai offert *hier* et qui compte parmi ceux qui aujourd'hui m'ont convié à ce

Timaeus' speech, - which is, according to Critias "[...] the most versed in astronomy and the one who has done the greatest work to penetrate the nature of the universe"¹² -, postulates the existence of a world-making demiurge. Just like a craftsman, this character constructs real things by reproducing the world of Ideas, eternal and invariable, that pre-exists his work.

"But we must still ask ourselves about the universe, according to which of the two types of models was made by its creator, from what remains identical and in the same state or from what it becomes. If our world is beautiful and if its demiurge is good, it is obvious that the demiurge has fixed its gaze on what is eternal; otherwise - a hypothesis that is not even allowed to be evoked - it would have been based on the model of what is engendered. It is evident to all that the demiurge has fixed his eyes on what is eternal; for this world is the most beautiful of all things that have been begotten, and its creator the best of causes. [...] Under these conditions our world must necessarily be the image of something."¹³

Note here the difference that the demiurge keeps with the God of monotheistic religions, who creates from nothing, from what does not exist. A demiurge does not create from the uncreated, but his function is to establish a bridge between two worlds: that of Ideas and that of the real. His work is to transcribe, transpose or copy the eternal Ideas in things.

"So, when a demiurge does something by fixing his eyes on what remains identical and taking an object of this kind as a model to reproduce its form and properties, everything he does when he makes it is necessarily beautiful; on the contrary, if he fixed his eyes on what is generated, the result would not be beautiful".¹⁴

banquet, où est-il ?»

PLATON – *Timée/Critias*, translation from Luc Bresson, Flammarion, Paris, 992 for the French edition, p. 97.

¹¹In fact, between Socrates' *yesterday* and *today* there are about twenty years (the time between both Plato's dialogs, *The Republic* and *The Timaeus*).

¹²« Critias – “[...] celui d'entre nous qui est le plus versé en astronomie et celui qui a fourni le plus de travail pour pénétrer la nature de l'univers[...]" »

Ibid., p. 114

¹³« Mais il faut encore se demander au sujet de l'univers, d'après lequel des deux sortes de modèles son fabriquant l'a réalisé, d'après ce qui reste identique et dans le même état où d'après ce qui devient ? Si notre monde est beau et si son demiurge est bon, il est évident que le démiurge a fixé ses regards sur ce qui est éternel ; autrement – Hypothèse qu'il n'est même pas permis d'évoquer – c'est sur ce qui est engendré. Il est évident pour tout le monde que le démiurge a fixé les yeux sur ce qui est éternel ; ce monde en effet est la plus belle des choses qui ont été engendrées, et son fabriquant, la meilleure de causes[...]. Dans ces conditions, notre monde doit de toute nécessité être l'image de quelque chose. »

PLATON – *Timée/Critias*, *op.cit.*, p.116-117.

¹⁴« Aussi, chaque fois qu'un démiurge fabrique quelque chose en posant les yeux sur ce qui reste identique et en prenant pour modèle un objet de ce genre pour en reproduire la forme et les propriétés, tout ce qu'il réalise en procédant ainsi est nécessairement beau ; au contraire, s'il fixé le yeux sur ce qui est engendré, le résultat ne serait pas beau. »

Here we see mimesis in action, but this time Plato describes it in a positive sense, not as the copy of a copy that he criticized from *The Republic* in the painters and playwrights of his time, but as the necessary fitting of the world of Ideas with the real world.

But the demiurge does not limit himself to make a copy of the eternal Ideas on a space-time material. The mediation of his figure is fundamental, because he will introduce characteristics and elements that are proper to him in the process of mimesis:

“Let us now say for what reason the one who constituted the becoming, that is, our universe, constituted it. He was good, and in what is good, there is no jealousy toward anyone. Without jealousy, he wished all things to be as similar as possible to him. Because the god wished that all things were good, and that there was nothing imperfect as far as possible. Thus he took into his hands all that was visible - that which was not at rest, but which moved without concert and without order - and brought it from disorder to order, having considered that order is infinitely better than disorder.”¹⁵

Thus, the complexity of mimesis is made manifest, where the demiurge not only transmits, but also appropriates the intelligible material in order to realize it on the sensitive, attributing to it characteristics of aesthetic (the beautiful) and moral (the good) order. Like Ideas, the sensible material pre-exists mimesis; it is in motion, “without concert or order”.

By introducing order into disorder, the demiurge performs an act of creation that goes beyond the tracing of Ideas:

“Having reflected, he realized that, of things that were visible by nature, his work could not give rise to a whole without intellect that was more beautiful than a whole provided with intellect, and that, on the other hand, it was impossible that the intellect be present in something devoid of soul. It was as a result of his reflections that he put the intellect in the soul, and the soul in the body, to build the universe, in order to achieve a work that was by nature the most beautiful and best possible. Therefore, according to an explanation that is only probable, it must be said that our world, which is a living being endowed

Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁵ « Disons maintenant pour quelle raison celui qui a constitué le devenir, c'est-à-dire notre univers, l'a constitué. Il était bon, or, en ce qui est bon, on ne trouve aucune jalouse à l'égard de qui que ce soit. Dépourvu de jalouse, il souhaita que toutes les choses devinssent le plus possible semblables à lui.[...] Parce que le dieu souhaitait que toutes les choses fussent bonnes, et qu'il n'y eût rien d'imparfait dans la mesure du possible, c'est bien ainsi qu'il prit en main tout ce qu'il y avait de visible – cela n'était point en repos, mais se mouvait sans concert et sans ordre – et qu'il l'amena du désordre à l'ordre, ayant estimé que l'ordre vaut infiniment mieux que le désordre. »

PLATON – *Timée/Critias*, op.cit., p. 118.

The figure of the demiurge as a mediator modifies the process through the way Ideas are applied to the universe.

Perhaps Plato could have developed this idea with regard to the similarity between demiurgic mimesis and the artist's mimesis. But in fact, it is his disciple Aristotle who will recover the notion of mimesis as a process of creation.

Aristotle's Mimesis

In order to fully understand what Aristotle meant by mimesis, we must reveal his complex conception of art, which is exhibited transversely in several of his works. Thus, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines art in its ancient meaning: as a practice of “things that can be otherwise than they are”, thus affirming its fundamentally contingent character.

“All art consists in producing, executing and combining the means of giving existence to one of the things that can and cannot be; and whose principle is in the one that does, and not in the thing that is done. Because there is no art in things that have a necessary existence, nor in those whose existence is the result of the forces of nature, since they carry in themselves the principle of their being”.¹⁷

Consequently, what the work affirms or denies should not be interpreted as objectively valid, since it refers to the subjective expression of the creator. Furthermore, if the principle of art is found in the artist and not in the object he or she produces, it necessarily follows that mimesis cannot be a mere imitation of a model, since the relationship with the model would be mediated by a process of

¹⁶« Ayant réfléchi, il se rendit compte que, de choses par nature visibles, son travail ne pourrait jamais faire sortir un tout dépourvu d'intellect qui fut plus beau qu'un tout pourvu d'intellect que, par ailleurs, il était impossible que l'intellect soit présent en quelque chose dépourvu d'âme. C'est à la suite de ses réflexions qu'il mit l'intellect dans l'âme, et l'âme dans le corps, pour construire l'univers, de façon à réaliser une œuvre qui fut par nature la plus belle et la meilleure possible. Ainsi donc, conformément à une explication qui n'est que vraisemblable, il faut dire que notre monde, qui est un vivant doué d'une âme pourvue d'un intellect, a, en vérité, été engendré par suite de la décision réfléchie d'un dieu. »

PLATON – *Ibid.*, p.118 -119.

¹⁷« Tout art consiste à produire, à exécuter, et à combiner les moyens de donner l'existence à quelqu'une des choses qui peuvent être et ne pas être ; et dont le principe est dans celui qui fait, et non dans la chose qui est faite. Car il n'y a point d'art des choses qui ont une existence nécessaire, ni de celles dont l'existence est le résultat des forces de la nature, puisqu'elles ont en elles-mêmes le principe de leur être ».

ARISTOTE, *La Morale ou Éthique à Nicomaque*, French translation by M. Thurot, Libro VI, VI (1140 a), Éd. Firmin Didot, Paris, 1824. Obraenlneae

<http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/philosophes/Aristote/morale6.htm>

introduction, internalization and identification of the artist in relation to his or her referential. How does this process work? Aristotle compares art with nature based on the observation of its teleological organization:

“In general, it can be said that sometimes art does things that nature cannot do, and sometimes it imitates nature. Now, if things in art have a why and an end, it is obvious that things in nature must also have a why and an end. Moreover, in the products of art and in the products of nature, the later facts are with the earlier facts in a very similar situation.”¹⁸

With Aristotle we are in the presence of a radically different way of conceiving the function of art, discovering a path that is proper to it and that keeps imitation separated from all pejorative content.

“The Stagirite gives the artist the task of founding a different ontological order, in which he preserves the teleology present in nature as a way of acting, but mimesis stops slavishly copying objects to focus on the creation of new entities”.¹⁹

This specific ontological field was defined by Aristotle in his Metaphysics and in his Nicomachean Ethics. In this latter he tells us :

“Let us assume that there are five states in which the soul declares what is true in an affirmative or negative way: art, science, prudence [φρονησις], wisdom and intuitive reason.”²⁰

Art in the ancient sense of the word, although it is a contingent practice of “what is so but can be in a different way”, is presented as a *Technê*, a form of knowledge through exercise and practice.

Taking into account everything we have just said about the Aristotelian conception of art, let us now return to its precious contribution, creative mimesis. The problem that commentators face is that the concept is not defined anywhere in Poetics. Halliwell²¹recognizes five different and overlapping meanings in the

¹⁸ *En général, on peut dire que tantôt l'art fait des choses que la nature ne saurait faire, tantôt qu'il imite la nature.* Or, si les choses de l'art ont un pourquoi et une fin, il est de toute évidence que les choses de la nature doivent avoir une également. D'ailleurs, dans les produits de l'art et dans les produits de la nature, les faits postérieurs sont avec les faits antérieurs dans une relation toute pareille. »

ARISTOTE,*Physique*,French translation by Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Volume II, Livro II, Chapter VIII, §6. Online in <http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/philosophes/Aristote/phys2.htm>

¹⁹ María CASTILLO MERLO, «La noción de Mímesis en Aristóteles», (“the notion of Mimesis in Aristotle”) en *Cuadernos de Filosofía* nº 51, Faculty of Philosophy, Buenos Aires, 2008, p. 91.

²⁰ « Admettons que les états par lesquels l'âme énonce ce qui est vrai sous une forme affirmative ou négative sont au nombre de cinq : ce sont l'art, la science, la prudence [φρονησις], la sagesse et la raison intuitive [...] »

ARISTOTE, *Éthique à Nicomaque*, French translation J. Tricot, Libro VI, 3 (1139b), Les Échos du Marquis editors, 1964, p. 132. Online in

<https://philosophie.cegeptr.qc.ca/wp-content/documents/Éthique-à-Nicomaque.pdf>

²¹ Stephen HALLIWELL, *The Poetics of Aristotle*, Londres, Duckworth, 1987.

Aristotelian concept of mimesis: a) visual representation, b) imitation of behaviour, c) personification, d) vocal imitation, e) metaphysical mimesis. By mimesis, we must also understand not only the action of imitation, but also what results or emerges from this action, including the artistic work.

Since the introduction of the *Poetic*, mimesis is presented as the genre in which all artistic manifestations are inserted:

"We will deal with poetic art itself and its species [...]. Epic and tragic poetry, as well as comedy, the art of the dithyrambic poet and, for the most part, that of the flute and zither, are, in general, imitations. But they differ from each other in three ways: either they imitate by different means, or they imitate different objects, or they imitate in different ways, and not in the same way."²²

In its purely imitative function, mimesis participates actively and congenitally in any learning process:

"Imitation is, in fact, since childhood, a natural inclination of human beings, who differ from other animals by their strong tendency to imitate and to learn through imitation [...]."²³

Far from being comparable to mirror reflections, as the Platonic metaphor relates, mimesis presents for Aristotle a degree of generalization that does not have the simple enumeration of events:

"[...] the role of the poet is not to tell what has really happened but what could have happened, what can be produced in accordance with verisimilitude or necessity. In fact, the difference between the historian and the poet does not stem from the fact that one expresses himself in verse and the other in prose (Herodotus' work could be put into verse, and would be no less history in verse than in prose); but it comes from the fact that one says what happened, the other says what can be expected. That's why poetry is something more philosophical and noble than history: poetry says the general, history says the particular".²⁴

²² « Nous allons traiter de l'art poétique lui-même et de ses espèces [...]. L'épopée, et la poésie tragique comme aussi la comédie, l'art du poète de dithyrambe et, pour la plus grande partie, *celui du joueur de flûte et de cithare, se trouvent tous être, d'une manière générale, des imitations*. Mais ils diffèrent les uns des autres par trois aspects : ou bien ils imitent par des moyens différents, ou bien ils imitent des objets différents, ou bien ils imitent selon des modes différents, et non de la même manière. »
ARISTOTELES, *Poétique*, French translation by Michel Magnien, Librairie Générale Française, 1990, (I, 1447), p. 85.

²³ « Imiter est en effet, dès leur enfance, une tendance naturelle aux hommes – et ils se différencient des autres animaux en ce qu'ils sont des êtres fort enclins à imiter et qu'ils commencent à apprendre à travers l'imitation [...]. »

ARISTOTELES, *Poétique*, op.cit.,(IV-1448 b), p. 88.

²⁴ « [...] le rôle du poète est de dire non pas ce qui a réellement eu lieu mais ce à quoi on peut s'attendre, ce qui peut se produire conformément à la vraisemblance ou à la nécessité. En effet, la différence entre l'historien et le poète ne vient pas du fait que l'un s'exprime en vers et l'autre en prose (on pourrait mettre l'œuvre d'Hérodote en vers, et elle ne serait pas moins de l'histoire en vers qu'en prose) ; mais elle vient de

That is to say that poetry, and by extension, art, have the possibility of accessing a universal knowledge through mimesis, thus advancing the subjective universality revealed by Kant in his *Critique of Judgment*.²⁵ Thus art is universal because mimesis exceeds the reference of reality, including elements of the creator's personality that complete the work. And in those elements the creator inscribes the Human in him, inscribes himself and inscribes us all, and forever, in the bosom of universality.

Thus, Aristotelian mimesis implies a process of projection and identification with the model. With this Aristotle also affirms mimetic immersion, to which he attributes a positive function. Aristotelian *catharsis*, – a term that has been adopted by psychoanalysis – would be a beneficial purgation of the passions, a purgation of the feelings of fear, pity or anger of the audience, which in the tragedy empathically identifies with the destiny of the characters.

Assuming the internalization achieved by the artist and the audience, Aristotelian mimesis is a creation that, although it may be inspired by reality, does not have to remain faithful to it, but only aims to represent it in a plausible context. As Aristotle indicates, in terms of how to compose an epic or a tragedy:

“What is impossible but probable is preferable to what is possible but not convincing.”²⁶

In Aristotle's thought, the probable plays an important role along with the true; it constitutes the basis of knowledge through exercise or *Technê*, which is different from theoretical knowledge in terms of purpose and method.

In fact, in some works such as *Logic*, *Metaphysics* or *History of Animals*, theory and practice are fundamentally separated: the object, as well as the content itself of the logos, pre-exists the subject who studies

ce fait que l'un dit ce qui a eu lieu, l'autre ce à quoi l'on peut s'attendre. Voilà pourquoi la poésie est une chose plus philosophique et plus noble que l'histoire : la poésie dit plutôt le général, l'histoire le particulier. » *Ibid.*, (IX-1451 b), p. 98.

²⁵ The subjective universality, which we won't develop here, is derived from the second definition of Beauty: „Schön ist das, was ohne Begriff allgemein gefällt.“ (“It is beautiful that which is universally liked without concept”).

Immanuel KANT, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, published by Wilhelm Weischedel, Suhrkamp, 1974, p. 134.

²⁶ « Il faut préférer ce qui est impossible mais vraisemblable, à ce qui est possible, mais n'entraîne pas la conviction. »

ARISTOTELES, *Poétique*, op.cit., (XXIV-1460 a), p. 126.

it. The Topics, Poetics or Rhetoric, on the other hand, constitute a knowledge in which theory and practice are inseparable, and in which the object and content of the discipline are inseparably identified with the practice of the subject. These disciplines give rise to heuristic treatises, in which the students learned to write a good tragedy, or to organize optimally the arguments during a controversy.

For Aristotle, mimesis finds a heuristic domain that is halfway between reality and fiction, since the artist expresses things not as they are but as they could be, transmuting facts, situations, characters, behaviours into his own expression.

That the emphasis is no longer placed on the representation of what is, but on the representation of what could be, is equivalent to taking mimesis definitively out of the realm of the objective and placing it on the side of the person who practices it, with all its burden of inescapable subjectivity, its experience, its appetites and its impulses. With Aristotle, the work is halfway between the model and the artist. Therefore, the absolute value of the referential model is strongly questioned, even though it remains the source of inspiration for creation. Consequently, the value we give to a work no longer depends on its relevance to describe the natural model. If the imitation of nature exists, it is given not by the imitated object but by the teleological process of polarization towards a purpose that both work and nature seem to realize.

By giving citizenship to fictions in mimesis and *a fortiori* in artistic creation, Aristotle affirms art as a heuristic of realization.

Hegel: Dialectics, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art

Continuing with the method exposed in his *Phenomenology*, Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics* consider art as a dialectic process that, from anonymous and abstract, is singularized and personalized until it merges into the absolute spirit. The dialectic is realised between two categories: the Idea that gives origin to the work, and the Form that it takes. Sensitive expression of the spirit, the art passes through three forms that correspond to more or less determined historical periods: symbolic art, classical art and romantic art.

In symbolic art the spirit is collective and anonymous, since the artistic individuality is immersed in myth. This is the moment of the characterization of the myth through the image, given fundamentally by

the architecture and the sculpture. Sensitive forms are abstract; this is the case with funeral monuments, bas-reliefs and statues, which symbolize an object of veneration and not a work with intrinsic characteristics that allow for an aesthetic evaluation. The Form does not necessarily correspond to the Idea; it is an external imposition on the representation, which comes from the religious paradigm, from the myth, and not from the work itself. This first moment of sublimit is characterized then, according to Hegel, by a lack of adequacy between Idea and Form.

The dissolution of symbolic art occurs when the spirit gradually transforms the abstract form into art that represents life, producing the encounter between idea and form, between meaning and expression.

"We have interpreted the symbolic form in general in such a way that in it, meaning and expression could not interpenetrate until a mutual plastic fusion was completed".²⁷

How is this conjunction possible? Hegel answers:

"It is reserved for a more consummate art form, the classical form, the fulfilment of these requirements".²⁸

In classical art the authorship of the work appears. The form represents the anatomical recognition, the expression, the reflection of a particular situation. The representation of the gods loses its immobility and its characteristic fixity of features, both of which are representative of absolute omnipresence, to create the illusion of movement and walking. The hieratic sculptures of the mythical gods, characteristic of symbolic art, give way to statues of the new art that abandon schematic representation to serve as a vehicle for the feelings and identification of the public, beyond simple representation.

"It is difficult to discover a more exciting spectacle than that of the magnificent awakening of Greek sculpture and painting between the 6th century B.C. and the time of Plato's youth, around the 5th century B.C. [...]

The archaic statues with rigid and fixed attitudes, which we call Apollos or Kuroi, begin to move one leg and then flex their arms, we see how their frozen mask smiles soften, and how, in the era of the Persian Wars, the line symmetry of their tense attitudes suddenly relaxes by a slight inflection of curves, so that life itself seems to penetrate these marble bodies [...]. The whole process is so

²⁷ « Nous avons conçu la forme symbolique en général de telle manière qu'en elle signification et expression ne pouvaient s'interpénétrer jusqu'à une fusion plastique mutuelle achevée [...] »

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, *Cours d'esthétique*, French translation by Jean-Pierre Lefebvre and Veronika von Schenk, Aubier, 1966 for the French translation, Book I, p. 560 -561.

²⁸ « Il est réservé à une forme d'art plus achevée, la forme classique, de satisfaire les exigences. »

Ibid. p. 562.

perfectly logical and inevitable that it seems very simple to arrange the different silhouettes in such a way that the successive stages of a continuous progress towards the figuration of life can be highlighted".²⁹

Classical art is the moment of beauty in the dialectical development of art, that is, the perfect adaptation of the Idea to the Form:

"The centre of art is constituted by the unification, closed in itself in a free totality, of content and form, which is purely and simply adequate to it. This reality, which coincides with the concept of beauty, and toward which the form of symbolic art tended in vain, only leads to phenomenal manifestation in classical art".³⁰

This ideal of beauty finds its optimal exponent in the Greek sculpture of the golden age of Pericles. Despite its differences, the classical form continues to express the religion of a people as in symbolicart. Veneration and aesthetic contemplation are indissolubly associated.

The dissolution of classicism occurs later, because the spirit, in its need to find a unitary principle of expression and beauty, surpasses the polytheism of ancient peoples.

"It is in them that the classical gods have the germ of their decadence, and therefore, when the deficiency in them reaches the consciousness through the development of art itself, they also cause the dissolution of classical art".³¹

"Their plurality and diversity is their contingency, and thought fuses them into the determination of a single divinity [...]."³²

²⁹ « Il est difficile de découvrir un spectacle plus passionnant que celui du magnifique éveil de la sculpture et de la peinture grecques, entre le VI^e siècle et le temps de la jeunesse de Platon, vers le V^e siècle avant notre ère. [...]】

On nous montre alors comment les statues aux attitudes raides et figées, que nous appelons des Apollons ou des *kuroi*, commencent à mouvoir une jambe, puis à plier les bras, comment leur sourire de masque figé s'adoucit, et comment, à l'époque des guerres médiques, la symétrie de lignes de leurs attitudes tendues se relâche soudain par une légère inflexion des courbes, si bien que la vie même semble pénétrer ces corps de marbre. [...] Le processus dans son ensemble paraît si parfaitement logique et inévitable qu'il semble fort simple de disposer les différentes silhouettes de façon à faire ressortir les étapes successives d'un progrès continu vers la figuration de la vie. »

Ernst Hans Josef GOMBRICH, *L'Art et l'illusion*, French translation by Guy Durand, Gallimard, 1971, p. 99.

³⁰ « Le centre de l'art est constitué par l'unification, close en elle-même en une libre totalité, du contenu et de la forme qui lui est purement et simplement adéquate. Cette réalité qui coïncide avec le concept du beau, et vers laquelle tendit en vain la forme artistique symbolique, n'est portée à la manifestation phénoménale qu'avec l'art classique. »

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, *op.cit.*, Book II, p. 11.

³¹ « C'est en eux-mêmes que les dieux classiques ont le germe de leur déclin, et donc, quand la déficience qui est en eux parvient à la conscience par le développement de l'art lui-même, ils entraînent aussi la dissolution de l'art classique. »

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, *op.cit.*, Book II, p. 99.

³² « Leur pluralité et leur diversité est leur contingence, et la pensée leur résout en la détermination d'une seule et unique divinité [...]. »

Ibid. p. 100.

With the monotheism of the Christian religion, according to Hegel, the romantic form appears. Note that polytheistic religions are indissolubly linked to peoples that produce them, meanwhile with Christianity a universal principle appears, beyond the people and the historical and geographical circumstances that generated it.

Romanticism constitutes a new sublimity, where, again, Idea and Form do not fit perfectly.

“The true content of Romanticism is absolute interiority. The corresponding form is spiritual subjectivity, as understanding of one's autonomy and freedom. This infinity in itself, this universal in and for itself is the negativity of any particularity, the simple unity with oneself that makes any dissociation impossible”.³³

In the effort to give shape to the creator's subjectivity, the artistic idea will gradually withdraw into itself, abandoning the natural model as an imitation. It is here where the theory of the death of art becomes a reality, since the dialectic Idea/Form disappears leaving the Idea free to it, that is, the absolute spirit of which art has been the sensible expression is finally manifested. As a consequence, reflection on art is part of art itself.

“The specific nature of the artistic production and its works no longer satisfies our greatest need; we no longer venerate works of art religiously and they do not constitute a cult object either; the impression they produce is now more tempered, more reassuring, and what they awaken in us requires a rational explanation, a reflective guarantee. Thought and reflection have eclipsed art”.³⁴

For all these reasons, Hegel affirms that art has already been, that it constitutes the past because it does not bring satisfaction to the spiritual needs of our time.

“In all these respects, art is and remains for us, as far as its highest destiny is concerned, something of the past. It has lost its authentic truth and life to us [...]. What the works of art invite us to now, apart from the immediate pleasure, is the exercise of our judgment: we submit the content of the work of art and its means

³³ « Le vrai contenu du romantique est l'intériorité absolue, la forme correspondante est la subjectivité spirituelle, comme saisie de son autonomie et de sa liberté. Cet infini en soi-même et cet universel en soi et pour soi sont la négativité de toute particularité, l'unité simple avec soi qui a consommé toute dissociation [...]. »

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, *op.cit.*, Book II, p. 122.

³⁴ « La nature toute spécifique de la production artistique et de ses œuvres ne satisfait plus notre plus haut besoin ; nous n'en sommes plus à pouvoir vénérer religieusement les œuvres d'art et à leur vouer un culte ; l'impression qu'elles produisent est à présent plus tempérée, plus rassise, et ce qui s'éveille en nous par leur intermédiaire nécessite encore une pierre de touche, une caution d'une autre ampleur. La pensée et la réflexion ont éclipsé le bel art. »

Ibid., Book I, p. 17

of exposure to the examination of our thoughts, evaluating their mutual adequacy or lack thereof. That is why the science of art is much more necessary in our time than in the days when art itself gave full satisfaction. Art now leads us to an examination through thought, not to provoke an artistic renaissance, but to scientifically recognize its nature as art.”³⁵

Hegel's Mimesis

From the first chapter of his Course of Aesthetics, Hegel rejects mimesis as the foundation of artistic work:

“From the point of view of simple imitation, art can never rival nature, and will be like a worm crawling behind an elephant.”³⁶

The same contempt is shown in the following quotation, which could have belonged to Plato:

“In general terms, the pleasure of the capacity for imitation can only be restricted, and it is more suitable for man to enjoy what he produces with his own resources. In this sense, the invention of the most insignificant technical work has a superior value, and man can be prouder of having invented the hammer, the nail, etc., than of being able to play the magician in imitation”.³⁷

Like Plato, Hegel understands mimesis as the faithful copy of the model, without taking into account the creator's work of interiorization. For him, art represents the different moments of truth, thanks to which the illusory appearances of the world are transformed into creations of the spirit.

For Hegel, mimesis is a departure from the path of Truth, since model and work would not be in a dialectical relationship, but in a perpetual misalignment:

³⁵ « Sous tous ces rapports, l'art est et reste pour nous, quant à sa destination la plus haute, quelque chose de révolu. Il a de ce fait perdu aussi pour nous sa vérité et sa vie authentiques [...]. Ce que les œuvres d'art suscitent à présent en nous, outre le plaisir immédiat, est l'exercice de notre jugement : nous soumettons à l'examen de notre pensée le contenu de l'œuvre d'art et ses moyens d'exposition, en évaluant leur mutuelle adéquation ou inadéquation. C'est pourquoi la science de l'art est bien plus encore un besoin à notre époque qu'elle ne l'était aux temps où l'art pour lui-même procurait déjà en tant que tel une pleine satisfaction. L'art nous invite à présent à l'examiner par la pensée, et ce non pas pour susciter un renouveau artistique, mais pour reconnaître scientifiquement ce qu'est l'art. »

HEGEL, *op.cit.*, Book I, p. 18-19.

³⁶ « Du point de vue de la simple imitation, l'art ne pourra jamais rivaliser avec la nature et se donnera l'allure d'un ver de terre rampant derrière un éléphant. »

Ibid., p. 62.

³⁷ « De manière générale, ce plaisir que suscite l'habileté imitative ne pourra jamais être que restreint, et il sied mieux à l'homme de prendre plaisir à ce qu'il produit à partir de ses propres ressources. En ce sens, l'invention du plus insignifiant de ouvrages techniques est d'un plus haute valeur, et l'homme peut tirer plus de fierté d'avoir inventé le marteau, le clou, etc. que de pouvoir jouer les prestidigitateurs en matière d'imitation ».

Ibid., p. 62-63.

“Hegel constantly strives to unite the two terms of any unresolved dualism. For example, the Idea is viewed to be the unity of subject and object: thought and reality are logically the same.

Hegel regards unresolved dualism as leading to the conclusion that it is impossible to know the Truth.

Any form of knowledge that ultimately does not ground a dualism in aunity fails to achieve genuine knowledge. Imitation would be inadmissible in Hegel's aesthetic as far as it presupposes a permanent disjunction of original and likeness.”³⁸

Inconsistencies of absolute idealism in relation to mimesis

However, when Hegel analyses the classical form, he is forced to admit that mimesis plays an indispensable role. In fact, in order to realize the dialectical movement producing the transformation of symbolic art into classical art, the two-fold process discovered by Aristotle is necessary: the search for similarity with the natural model is inscribed in the growing individuation of the artist in gestation. Against Hegel, we can affirm that, within the dialectic movement, mimesis would be the awareness of the spirit in search of its realization.

“Where the symbolic artist strives to imprint meaning on the figure's form or vice versa, the classical artist models meaning to the point of transforming it into a figure, doing little more than freeing the already given external manifestations from their unwelcome dross. But in this activity [...] he does not limit himself to reproducing a form, nor to reproducing a fixed type, but at the same time he advances the production of the forms as a whole”.³⁹

At this point, Hegel converges with Aristotle by attributing to mimesis a creative role.

“Greek art absorbed Greek religion; the content of art and of religion were largely one and the same, and within such a setting, mimesis is seen by Hegel to be a completely adequate means of disclosing truth. In imitating the human form and the human deed - the outward and the inward life of man - the Greek artist was seen by Hegel to be capable of producing art that fully expressed divinity and which was never surpassed.

³⁸Joyce ALANA YATES, *Aristote, Hegel and mimesis*, doctoral thesis, National Library of Canada, 1989, p. 106.

³⁹« Là où l'artiste symbolique s'efforce d'imprimer à la signification la forme de la figure ou inversement, l'artiste classique modèle la signification jusqu'à la transformer en figure, en ne faisant pour ainsi dire que libérer les manifestations extérieures déjà données de leurs scories inopportunnes. Mais dans cette activité [...] il ne fait pas que reproduire une forme, pas plus qu'il n'en reste à un type figé, mais il fait en même temps, pour l'ensemble, progresser la production des formes».

HEGEL, *op.cit.*, Book II, p. 26.

Hegel's reference above to the Greek artist as an imitator who is nonetheless creative, sets an important precedent. Here, Hegel is admitting that the imitation of a content that may be characterized as being ideal before it is given external shape is more than the careful and industrious translation into sensuous terms of an especially suitable prototype or content. [...]

In this context only, Hegel acknowledges that imitation can be characterized by elements of true and free creativity".⁴⁰

Let us remember that the dialectic consists, according to Hegel, in a systematic process to reach the Truth through which the consciousness passes, developing in successive stages, from the general and abstract to the concrete particularization. The Truth constitutes the totality of these moments, which derive from each other in a continuous flow: Thesis, the starting point, Antithesis, its negation, and Synthesis, the moment that includes and surpasses these first two.

Mimesis, on the other hand, is a different process: here the plausible has a place, since it serves as a detonator for the imagination of the creator to carry out his work. Here it is not the truth that matters, but the heuristic value of the principles at stake: the impossible is preferable to the possible without conviction. Also, along with fictions, plausible lies and absurdities are admitted:

“Above all, Homer taught others how to tell lies -that is, how to make use of false reasoning.”⁴¹

“Even the absurd can be accepted, as for instance the non-rational passages of the Odyssey, such as the landing of Ulysses, would not be bearable if they had been composed by a mediocre poet; but here, the poet knows how to hide the absurd by making use of his arts and of its qualities”.⁴²

⁴⁰Joyce ALANA YATES, *op.cit.*, p. 148-149.

⁴¹« Par-dessus tout, Homère a encore appris aux autres la manière de dire de mensonges – c'est-à-dire de manier le raisonnement faux. »

ARISTOTELES, *Poétique*, *op.cit.*(XXIV-1460 a), p. 126.

⁴² « Même l'absurde pourra être accepté, puisqu'il est clair que les passages non rationnels de l'Odyssée, comme la scène du débarquement d'Ulysse, ne seraient pas supportables s'ils avaient été composés par un mauvais poète ; mais ici, le poète sait dissimuler l'absurde en ayant recours à des assaisonnements et par d'autres qualités »

ARISTOTELES, *Poétique*, *op.cit.*(XXIV-1460 a),p. 127.

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Both idealisms, platonic and absolute, ignore in the mimesis the difference between inspiration and tracing. An individual process of creation is generated when the artist is inspired by the model to develop his work. In the case of *The Republic*, Plato could have developed the mimetic immersion he discovers in Homer to understand what happens to the poet when he speaks in the first person, and through him, what happens to artists in general: finally, the appropriation of the model is part of the artistic process. In relation to *The Timaeus*, the demiurge, far from exclusively translating the immutable ideas of the *Topus Uranus* into a sensitive reality, brings his reflection, his decisions and choices without which the work would be unfinished.

Let us now come to absolute idealism: dialectics and mimesis correspond to two very different functions of the spirit. The method of the first corresponds to the *principle of sufficient reason*, which a contemporary of Hegel analyses in his doctoral thesis:

“So important is the principle of sufficient reason that it can be considered the foundation of all the sciences. Science is nothing but a system of knowledge, that is, a set of chained truths, as opposed to a mere aggregation of knowledge. And who but the principle of sufficient reason can chain the members of such a system? Indeed: what distinguishes a science from a mere aggregate is that its truths are born from each other as from its own principle.”⁴³

From *On the fourfold root of the Principle of sufficient reason*,

and continuing with his famous work *The World as Will and Representation*, Arthur Schopenhauer delimits the fields in which the principle of reason works, from the one in which it is shown to be totally inoperative: the arts.

Dialectics is subordinated to the principle of reason; it indicates a *succession of moments* causally chained to each other, where the spirit becomes aware of itself. The absolute spirit is the result of this process. In no case does the emotion of a particular work arise, but the three moments of art according to Hegel arise from a concatenated observation of the whole.

⁴³ Arthur Schopenhauer, *La cuádrupla raíz del principio de razón suficiente*, translation to Spanish by Eduardo Ovejero y Maury, Librería general de Victorino Suárez. Preciados, 48. Madrid, 1911, capítulo I, 4.
«Importancia del principio de razón suficiente», online in
<https://www.derechopenalenlared.com/libros/schopenhauer-cuaduple-raiz-principio-razon-suficiente.pdf>

Mimesis, on the other hand, belongs to the creative process; it is elaborated *not from a succession, but from a simultaneity of situations and events*, which result in a simultaneous, not successive knowledge that we will call *global intuition of form*. This intuition is for the artist a sort of *Aleph*, indescribable in words, where everything happens at the same time:

“In that gigantic instant, I saw millions of delightful or atrocious acts; none amazed me as much as the fact that they all occupied the same point, without overlap or transparency. What my eyes saw was simultaneous: what I will transcribe, successive, because language is successive. Something, however, I will pick up.”⁴⁴

This intuition is a totality, between the artist and his work, between the work and the model, between the artist and the model, between the performer and the public, etc. In all cases, there is art when, at least at times, *it is not possible to distinguish where one begins and where the other ends*.

To mimesis as art we can apply this enlightening quotation:

“True art does not enter into competition with the world: it relies on its own logic and its own criteria, which cannot be tested by standards of truth or goodness applicable in other fields of activity.”⁴⁵

In the second part of the chapter we will analyse the practical applications of mimesis in relation to the possibility of recreating a musical work from its listening and perceptual reconstruction. This is a proposal of Musical Heuristics, discipline that we will describe in first place.

⁴⁴: “En ese instante gigantesco, he visto millones de actos deleitables o atroces; ninguno me asombró como el hecho de que todos ocuparan el mismo punto, sin superposición y sin transparencia. Lo que vieron mis ojos fue simultáneo: lo que transcribiré, sucesivo, porque el lenguaje lo es. Algo, sin embargo, recogeré.”

Jorge Luis BORGES, *El Aleph*, complete story of his book *Ficciones*, online in
<https://ciudadseva.com/texto/el-aleph/>

⁴⁵ Ananda Kentish COOMARASWAMY, *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard University Press, 1934, p. 25.

HEURISTICS, MUSICAL HEURISTICS AND MIMESIS: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WORKS

The term “heuristics”

“Heuristics is an old discipline. Older than aesthetics, older than the philosophy of art in the strict sense of the term, older than most of the methodologies developed by the arts in modern times. It appears under the names of *Ars inveniendi*, *Heuretics*, *Ereunetik*, *Zetetics* and also *Analyse* [...]. One can follow its steps from Leibniz's project of a combinatorial art (1666) to Kant's definition of "heuristic concepts", passing through Hans Vaihinger's description of "heuristic fictions" or Imre Lakatos' formulation of "heuristic principles of a research program.”⁴⁶

Etymologically speaking, this word is an irregular derivation of εύρισκω, which means in Greek, "I found it". From this root also derives the word *eureka*. Heuristics is the method of imagination that prepares for invention and discovery, assuming that all arguments are good if they can achieve the proposed objectives. Therefore, a principle is heuristic when it is considered not on the basis of the truth it supports but for the fact of contributing totally or partially to the realization of a project. A *fortiori*, it can be said that if the various components that serve as a starting point for a project are legitimized in whole or in part, not by their experimental verification, but pragmatically by the simple fact of having participated in the overall realization of the project, the method used is heuristic. The components that participate in the heuristic realization of a project can be proven principles, hypotheses or fictions. Hypotheses always maintain a pretension of experimental verification, while fictions cannot be verified: they are a pure product of the imagination, which elaborates them as elements that fit properly to explain the plausibility of a theory. Fictions can continue to assert

⁴⁶ „Die Heuristik ist eine alte Disziplin. Älter als die Ästhetik, älter als eine Philosophie der Kunst im engeren Sinne, älter auch als die meisten Methodologien, die die Künste seit der Neuzeit herausgebildet haben. Sie erscheint unter Begriffen wie *arsinveniendi*, *Heuretic*, *Ereunetik*, *Zetetik* oder auch *Analysis*; von Leibniz' Versuch einer *Arte combinatoria* (1666), über Kants Unterscheidung "heuristischer Begriffe", zu Hans Vaihingers Beschreibung "heuristischer Fiktionen" oder Imre Lakatos' Formulierung der heuristischen Prinzipien eines Forschungsprogramms“.“

Holger SCHULZE, „Heuristik“, online

in http://194.95.94.66:8080/sites/content/themen/forschung/graduiertenkollegbr_1998_2005/veroeffentlichen/gen/poesis/autoren/heuristik_holger_schulze/index_ger.htm

themselves as such, without undermining the general validity of the theory in which they participate.

From a general point of view, the proposed method for framing an ongoing creative process is heuristic, whether in the field of philosophy, science or the arts.

The term “heuristic” is applied as a noun and/or as an adjective to define or address concepts related to practice and performance in a plurality of sciences and disciplines, such as economics, law, history, chemistry, mathematics, and computer science. As for the heuristic approach to the sciences, it can be stated that

“This term of scientific methodology is used to describe all the intellectual instruments, all the processes and, more generally, all the approaches that promote discovery - in accordance with the Greek root of the word - or invention in the sciences. It has also been used to designate, in a more global way, one of the two fundamental epistemological dimensions of the scientific activity, the one that tries to reflect on the conditions of what Bacon called "the increase of the Sciences". Through this broader definition, heuristics constitutes a true theory of the elaboration of science. It will be necessary, therefore, to distinguish between a methodological qualification that designates the techniques of discovery and what could be called a general heuristic within the framework of epistemology, which is in charge of describing and reflecting the general conditions of the progress of scientific activity – opposing, as well as complementing, this part of the methodology that deals with the conditions of justification and legitimization of knowledge –.

But heuristics also eludes to [...] the technique or the art of inventing. It is by referring to the very sources of methodological reflection on knowledge that we can discern the emergence of the first heuristic considerations.”⁴⁷

⁴⁷« Ce terme de méthodologie scientifique qualifie tous les outils intellectuels, tous les procédés et plus généralement toutes les démarches favorisant la découverte — c'est la racine grecque du mot — ou l'invention dans les sciences. On a pu également désigner par là, d'une manière plus globale, l'une des deux dimensions épistémologiques fondamentales de l'activité scientifique, celle qui tente de réfléchir les conditions de ce que Bacon appelait « l'augmentation des Sciences ». Au travers de cette définition plus large, l'heuristique constitue une véritable théorie de l'élaboration de la science. Il conviendra donc de distinguer une qualification méthodologique qui désigne les techniques de découverte, et ce que l'on pourrait nommer une heuristique générale comme partie de l'épistémologie ayant en charge de décrire et de réfléchir les conditions générales du progrès dans l'activité scientifique — s'opposant, tout en la complétant, à cette partie qui s'intéresse aux conditions de justification et de légitimation des connaissances.

Mais l'heuristique fait allusion aussi à [...] la technique ou l'art d'inventer. C'est en se reportant aux sources mêmes de la réflexion méthodologique sur la connaissance que l'on peut discerner l'apparition des premières considérations heuristiques. » *Encyclopedia Universalis*, definición de « heurística », online in <http://www.universalis.fr/corpus2-encyclopedie/117/0/K924405/encyclopedie/HEURISTIQUE.htm>

Today, heuristics is presented as a problem-solving method in which the causal sequence of the premises or the orderly conduct of the argument, from known to unknown, is inoperative:

“The constitution of artificial intelligence will bring to the notion of heuristics an unprecedented fortune. With Herbert and Simon (1972), heuristics enters the theory of the General Problem Solvers. In the field of artificial intelligence, we can define heuristics with Jean Petitot (1992) as “non-systematic rules that allow us to manage in situations where systematization is not effective”.⁴⁸

Starting in the 1970s and as a result of Tony Buzan's research on the human brain⁴⁹, the heuristic scheme, also called heuristic mapping for problem solving, became widespread. A heuristic map – also known as mind map or idea map – is a diagram that establishes semantic links between different ideas, postulating possible relationships between various concepts. It is a kind of global scheme whose symbolism, representing the known elements of a problem, can remain visually present during all the moments of its elaboration. This produces a content of free association between the elements, regardless of the hierarchies established between them and their cause-effect relationships. Based on this principle, it was possible to design several programs capable of elaborating heuristic schemes with applications in all domains (Mike Jetter's MindManager, or FreeMind) as well as search engines with visual interfaces (Kartoo).

We define a heuristic project more broadly as a project that relates the teleological objective that is its ideal result (fiction) with the material effects that arise from it and are likely to be demonstrated (truths). This means that the relationship between truth and fiction is much closer than it seems.⁵⁰ Kant describes the boundaries between the two in an extremely poetic way:

“Now we have not only travelled through the land of understanding and carefully considered each of its parts, but we have also measured and determined for each thing its place. This country, however, is an island and is enclosed by nature itself within immutable limits. It is the land of truth, (a fascinating name), surrounded by a vast and stormy ocean, the very seat of illusion, where many banks of fog and the soon-melting ice floes lead us to mistakenly believe in new lands and, constantly deceiving the exalted sailor

⁴⁸ Michel LETER, « Définir l'heuristique », artículo en línea en <http://aboutleter.chez-alice.fr/pages/etexts%20ml/Definir%20l'heuristique.html>

⁴⁹ Tony et Barry BUZAN, *Dessine-moi l'intelligence*, éditions d'Organisation, 1995 for the French translation.

⁵⁰ In almost all dialogs from Plato, *mythos* – fiction – contributes to determinate *logos*– truth–. *The Republic* in part (the “Allegory of the Cave”, for instance) or *The Timaeus* as a whole, are good examples of this statement.

with vain hopes at the prospect of new discoveries, entangle him in adventures which he will never be able to renounce, but which he will not be able to carry out either".⁵¹

In this broader sense, any method, any systematization, any organization of principles is heuristic since it constitutes the horizon of a project that cannot be objectively verified because it is by nature unfinished (for example, the method, systematization and axiomatic of a science).

Musical Heuristics

The teaching we started in 1984 under the name of Musical Creation at the University of Lille, France, can be considered the starting point of this discipline. Its objective was to provide a complement to musical analysis, starting from the idea that knowledge of music implies, in parallel to any hermeneutic approach, another positioning, practical, pragmatic, which adds to the first one an indispensable experience and motivation. Only in this way did it seem possible for us to experience the complexity of the musical phenomenon, halfway between an evanescent gesture and a finished realization. In fact, music is the result of the interaction between several superimposed processes – internal hearing, composition, interpretation, score writing, instrument making, recording, room acoustics, etc. – which are all interrelated and which determine the quality of the result. In this context, musicology is a meta language that, again, applies the principle of reason to an object that, by nature, escapes from it. Thus the method of musicology chains successions of cause to effect, when music is characterized by simultaneities that cannot be reduced to a linear interpretation. Only in a discursive space external to the music it is possible to isolate components such as themes, motifs, developments. The musical reality, for its part, remains indifferent to any interpretation of this nature and is presented as a continuum that is inseparable in parts. These points to a fundamental difference between

⁵¹ „Wir haben jetzt das Land des reinen Verstandes nicht allein durchreist, und jeden Teil davon sorgfältig in Augenschein genommen, sondern es auch durchmessen, um jedem Dinge auf demselben seine Stelle bestimmt. Dieses Land aber ist eine Insel, und durch die Natur selbst in unveränderliche Grenzen eingeschlossen. Es ist das Land der Wahrheit (ein reizender Name), umgeben von einem weiten und stürmischen Ozeane, dem eigentlichen Sitze des Scheins, wo manche Nebelbank, und manches bald weggeschmelzende Eis neue Länder lügt, und indem es den auf Entdeckungen herumschwärmenden Seefahrer unaufhörlich mit leeren Hoffnungen täuscht, ihn in Abenteuer verflechtert, von denen er niemals ablassen und sie doch auch niemals zu Ende bringen kann.“

Immanuel KANT, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1971, p. 287.

musicology and music. While the former tries to explain music as something that happened (hermeneutic interpretation), music performs what happens. Facts versus acts: two ontologically different components of our knowledge. Trying to avoid this discrepancy, Theodor W. Adorno had conceived the immanent analyses, proposing *ad hoc* categories that adapted to the composition like a glove to the hand. Perhaps unwittingly, Adorno faced a problem that went beyond the strictly musicological. Indeed, the inescapable weakness of any discourse – already revealed by Plato in his *Seventh Letter* on the objectivising and presupposing function of language – is that the discourse *hides the thing at the same time as it reveals it*.⁵² Moreover, the word, and in particular the written word, adds essentialities that do not exist in the reality it describes: that is why for the Stoics the phrase “the grass is green” should be written as “the grass is greening”, thus avoiding introducing an essential attribute in what is just the continuity of a living process. What we say suits perfectly to musicology. With the same procedure by which musical analysis introduces criteria of intelligibility into music, it also distorts it by depriving it of its natural and living fluidity. Given that analysis, in its effort to understand the work, tends to reduce it to a limited and static sampling of significant moments, it seemed to us that there was an urgent need to develop a complementary knowledge of music that addresses it as what it really is: a continuous dynamic process. In favour of this position, there is also another important reason: apart from the interactions we have already mentioned, music is not only made of sounds, but also of everything between sounds, which no analysis can reveal. This latter interaction is infinite, ineffable and imponderable; only fiction can explain it as emergent. The silence, the intersections, the interlacing, the transitions constitute the true being of music, which no discrete and discontinuous approach allows us to address. But we must bear in mind that the continuous character of music is not to demonstrate: it is to feel like energy deployed in multiple intersections and passages between moments, emerging through what we hear and feel and also keeping an interaction with our personal experience.

By proposing to reveal this energy through artistic practice, Musical Creation sought to articulate itself with other musicological teachings. At the beginning of the implementation of this discipline at the university, we started from the hypothesis that all the creative processes

⁵²To deepen this point, see the article by Giorgio AGAMBEN, "La chose même", in his book *La puissance de la Pensée, essais et conférences*, (*The Power of Thought, Essays and Conférences*) French translation by Joël Gayraud and Martin Rueff, Editions Payot&Rivages, Paris, 2006 by the French edition.

taken together, both those of confirmed composers and those of the creators of other expressions or of students, have something in common. Being able to put students in a position to create - most of them are instrumental musicians studying in conservatories - even with sometimes very simple or rudimentary means, allowed them to understand and appreciate all kinds of creative processes at the same time. In this way, through its own motivation, Musical Creation contributed to open a real path for the assimilation of music. To achieve this ideal, we had implemented several procedures as guides of the creative process. The students' compositions, the result of the application of this *sui generis* methodology, were performed in concerts that they themselves organized at the end of each academic year.

After several years we were able to prove that our initial hypothesis produced musical, musicological and aesthetic consequences. From the musical point of view, the students learned to organize their creativity by producing small exercises, written in traditional or graphic scores, for all types of instruments and electro-acoustic devices. From the musicological point of view, the knowledge of the pieces of the contemporary repertoire was extended with this other vision, which came from the lived experience. Among the creative proposals, students performed reconstructions of works by ear, for their own instruments or voices. By the end of the course, they had learned the reference piece by heart, and most importantly, they had incorporated their own experience, learning to love it and know it.

From a transdisciplinary point of view, the parallelism that the proposal presupposes between the creative processes, all of them combined, had interactive effects, building bridges between the different artistic expressions (theatre, dance, mime, cinema, among others). At the same time, this vision has made possible to foresee the extension of the scope of modern classical music towards other types of music (jazz, rock, rap, traditional music). Another opening that deserves to be mentioned is the assimilation and subsequent use of technical devices for the realization of mixed pieces, live electronics, multimedia, sound installations, collective composition on the Internet, interactive composition, etc.

The implementation of our initial hypothesis had resulted in this discipline: Musical Creation. In its original conception, it consisted of a certain number of pedagogies aimed at producing, stimulating and accompanying the students' creations. These strategies for learning

creative music were applied over a period of 30 years, at different times, responding to the pragmatic needs of students at a given time. Until that time, it had not been necessary to systematize the principles that framed these strategies. But this whole corpus of proposals created ad hoc was characterized by an eclecticism very rich in results, but without any harmonization of principles. Musical creation lacked a solid epistemological basis that could function as a structure in which to subsume the creative proposals as special cases. This epistemological basis is Musical Heuristics.

Music Heuristics is the discipline that functions as an intersection between philosophy, music, musicology, musical aesthetics and creative pedagogy. It stimulates studies and models the different forms of creative processes in music, analysing also the different fictions that are present in these processes.⁵³

The fictions of musical composition are related to the sensation of change in the personality of the creators, as the outline of their work becomes more precise. For example, it is very common for composers to feel the music they are producing as another presence, different from themselves. At some point in the creative process, the composer may feel that the music imposes its own logic on him and shows him the path to follow for its optimal realization. An example: several years after the creation of *The Rite of Spring*, Stravinsky affirmed publicly that he had been just an instrument through which the work had come into the world.

“In the great art, and it is only the great art we are talking about here, the artist remains, in relation to the work, something indifferent, almost as if it were a passage for the birth of the work, which would be annihilated in the creation”⁵⁴

⁵³ Musical Heuristics was part of the Master's programme of the Department of Musical Studies and Dance and the Centre for Contemporary Arts Studies (CEAC), Faculty of Humanities, University of Lille, France, from 2012 to 2019.

Today it integrates the Master's programme in Musical Creation, New Technologies and Traditional Arts (Creación Musical, Artes Tradicionales y Nuevas Tecnologías) of the University 3 de Febrero, Argentina.

⁵⁴ « Dans le grand art, et c'est du grand art seulement qu'il est ici question, l'artiste reste, par rapport à l'œuvre, quelque chose d'indifférent, à peu près comme s'il était un passage pour la naissance de l'œuvre, qui s'anéantirait lui-même dans la création. »

Martin HEIDEGGER, « L'origine de l'œuvre d'art », in *Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part*, French translation by Wolfgang Brockmeier, Gallimard, 1962 for the French translation., p. 42.

Another example of fiction is given by the general intuition of form during the composition process. Very often, the creators have the impression that the piece has already been born and, in the representation of this piece as a reality, they organize the path to follow and the actions to perform. In fact, for many of them the piece already exists, even when it is just *in statu nascendi*.

Let's remember here the words of Webern:

“Our series - Schönberg's, Berg's and mine - are mostly the result of an idea that is related to a total vision of the work”.⁵⁵

Many composers build their own language from the confrontation between the musical materials at their disposal and a global intuition of form, through a progressive identification and selective choice of materials and behaviours. Their composition process is organized teleological in the form of an inverted pyramid, with an increasing degree of determination in relation to the definition of events.

Other composers consider composition to be an involuntary, non-teleological act. Strictly speaking, the notion of creation itself contradicts this lack of intentionality. In reality, as we have already demonstrated⁵⁶, *not wanting* means in fact *wanting always but in a different way*. Thus, even in the most indeterminate work (4'33" by John Cage, or Folio by Earl Brown, for example), a minimum of precision and preliminaries must be established so that the project is feasible and recognized in its various variants and versions.

To compose his work, the creator has a series of dominant ideas, which function as fixed points around which the piece develops. These ideas are heuristic principles of creation. In perfect agreement with what Aristotle said about art in general, their fundamental characteristic is contingency; they are like that, but they could be otherwise. As far as music is concerned, generative ideas vary according to the composer and, within the production of the same composer, according to his maturity and the problems posed by his creations. In fact, what composers declare as compositional principles are, for the most part,

⁵⁵ « Nos séries — celles de Schönberg, de Berg et les miennes — sont la plupart du temps le résultat d'une idée qui est en relation avec une vision de l'œuvre conçue comme un tout. »

Anton WEBERN, lecture from 26. February 1932, published in *Chemin vers la nouvelle musique (The way to new music)*, edition Jean-Claude Lattès, French translation by Anne Servant, Didier Alluard et Cyril Huvé, 1980 for the French translation, p. 138-139.

⁵⁶ See « L'autre vouloir: Contributions critiques pour une meilleure compréhension de l'esthétique de John Cage » (“The other way of willing: critical contributions for a better understanding of John Cage's aesthetics”) in *Revue d'Analyse Musicale* N° 49, Paris, 2003.

heuristic fictions that feed their conviction. They serve as points of support for the realization of their works and are deeply rooted in composition.

It is for this reason that the theories of Schillinger, Messiaen, Boulez, Xenakis, Schaeffer, Stockhausen, Pousseur, Penderecki, Lutoslawski, Cage, Brown, Nono, Berio, Maderna, Ligeti, Scelsi, Grisey, Ferneyhough, and all other great creators not mentioned here, should be interpreted according to their heuristic value, and not according to their objective truth value. This is valid even when the theories invoked have an objective value in the fields of science or philosophy. The only plausible demonstration of their value in relation to the creator is the fact that they have been used concretely in the composition of some of his pieces. In the various articles concerning some of the creators mentioned above, we have observed a series of inconsistencies in their respective discourses and procedures.⁵⁷ Our concern was to demonstrate *ad absurdum* the lack of consequence of their statements in relation to the processes of musical creation they were trying to explain. The contradictions in the discourses of these creators could have serious consequences if we were to take what they say as absolute truth. This is certainly not the case. Our hypothesis is that the creator's paradigm does not collapse for lack of logical consistency, but quite the opposite: *inconsistency and contradiction are the fuel of creation*. What a composer claims do not necessarily have to be true; it is enough to be plausible, convincing as to serve pragmatically as a basis for the updated interpretation of the reasons the composer claims. This is musical heuristics in action. And here is a beautiful example:

Iannis Xenakis was a composer who, as is well known, used statistical formulas of probability to determine the temporal and spatial distribution of musical events in his works. In his interview with François Delalande, Xenakis stated, in relation to the composition of his piece Pola ta Dhina :

⁵⁷ Ricardo MANDOLINI,

- « Schillinger ou le rêve de la raison » ("Schillinger o el sueño de la razón"), in *Mélange des arts*, éd. Joëlle Caullier, Université Lille III, Lille, 1998, p. 45-59.

- « Boulez-Xenakis, la conjonction des utopies » ("Boulez- Xenakis, la conjunción de las utopías"), in *Présences de Iannis Xenakis*, éd. Makis Solomos, Centre de Documentation de la Musique Contemporaine, París, 2001, p. 67-70.

- „Zusammentreffen der Utopien : Pierre Boulez und Iannis Xenakis“ ("Boulez- Xenakis, la conjunción de las utopías") in *Musiktexte, Zeitschrift für neue Musik* N° 90, Trans. Annette Theis, Cologne : Musiktexte GbR, 2001, p. 53-57.- « Adorno, ou la discussion qui n'a pas eu lieu » ("Adorno, o la discusión que nunca se produjo" in *Musique, instruments, machines: Autour des musiques électroacoustiques*, éd. Bruno Bossis, Anne Veitl and Marc Battier, Université París IV Sorbonne, París, 2007, p. 151-202.

I.X. - [...] "here it was intuition again that worked. That is, after the experience of the previous works, it was easy to simulate many things. That's what I did, without any calculation that is to say that (the composition, N.B.) went by itself".

F.D. – "That is to say, you have recreated something that is in the same style... as the pieces of the ST series, for example?

I.X - "Or from before, or from Pithoprakta too."⁵⁸

That is, here Xenakis simulated the use of probability formulas, proceeding as if a statistical calculation served as a formal skeleton for the piece. In fact, and this is the most interesting thing, it is not the ear that can really distinguish between a work composed intuitively and another work based on mathematics. Thus we come to the conclusion that the formulas are not a real prerequisite for Xenakis' music; they are used as an aid to memory of the composition. The essential thing is that Xenakis was absolutely convinced of the value of these formulas at the time of their use. But, for the sake of his works, Xenakis was aware of the differences in quality between pure mathematical results and what his taste dictated. Therefore, even in the most formal period of his thinking, he always managed to "fix" the results of the formulas so that they gave the musical result he desired.

Creative mimesis: the reconstruction of works

Straight application of Aristotle's mimesis, understood as interpretation and creation from a model, Musical Heuristics proposes the reconstruction of works as a complement to musicological analysis. The experience of reconstruction is a heuristic fiction that gives rise to a musical, instrumental and/or vocal or electro-acoustic experience. It is performed in pieces that cannot be deciphered either harmonically or melodically.⁵⁹ Knowing in advance the rudiments of a graphic semiology,

⁵⁸ « I.X – [...] là c'est l'intuition de nouveau qui a fonctionné. C'est-à-dire qu'après l'expérience des œuvres précédentes, il était facile de simuler des tas de choses. C'est ce que j'ai fait, sans calcul, c'est-à-dire que cela allait tout seul, quoi. »

F.D – « C'est à dire que vous avez recréé quelque chose qui en somme est du même style ... que les pièces par exemple de la série ST ? »

I.X – « Ou avant, ou de Pithoprakta aussi. »

François DELALANDE,*Il faut être constamment un immigré*, Entretiens avec Xenakis, Bibliothèque de Recherche Musicale, INA - Buchet/Chastel, Pierre Zech editor, Paris, 1997.

⁵⁹ For instance, instrumental/vocal contemporary music of the 50ths and 60ths, from Giorgy Ligeti, Krzysztof Penderecki, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Iannis Xenakis, etc.

the participants of the experience (musicologists, students, music teachers, professional musicians) make first the transcription of the music they hear, which will emerge from multiple comparative auditions. The original score should not be immediately disclosed. It is temporarily replaced by a recorded version.

After each audition, the person conducting the experiment (teacher, musicologist) progressively completes the analysis of the reference work. This gives a renewed and deep meaning to the listening and to the determination of its highlights.

Once the graphic transcription has been made, the participants in the reconstruction experience organize themselves by making a double entry table. In the right-hand column they write down the events of the work that have been identified, with the symbols attributed to them, and the moment of appearance in relation to the overall duration of the piece. In the left column are indicated the vocal/ instrumental/ electro acoustic actions proposed as auditory reconstruction or imitation of the former. The teacher or group leader will help in the realization of the experience, proposing various solutions of instrumentation adapted to the sound sources available in the group. All proposals for reconstruction are played, and are adopted or discarded by the group taking as a criterion the degree of appropriateness to the actions they imitate. In this way, the auditory transcription evolves towards a new score, taking into account the proposed instrumental imitations.

After the reconstruction is completed, the group leader presents the original score. This is the moment to complement the experience with different analytical approaches; the more they are, the richer the experience of the participants will be.

The comparison between the auditory transcription, the reconstruction score and the original score gives a very instructive result. From the musicological point of view, the heuristic fiction of the reconstruction will have made it possible to coordinate the level of listening to the work with a new process of creation, that of the participants. In this way, they have the sensation of appropriating the work, to which the dynamic and perceptive continuity of the experience contributes. It is not surprising that at the end of the reconstruction the participants know the work of reference by heart.

From the musical point of view, the participants will have produced a work that certainly has similarities with the model, but that keeps its independence as a creation.⁶⁰

CODA

“The stone is heavy, it shows its heaviness. But while this heaviness comes to us, the stone rejects at the same time any intrusion into it. If we try to penetrate it by breaking it, its broken pieces will never reveal anything inner to our eyes. The rock withdraws immediately to its pieces, to its deaf and massive gravity. If we want to capture this gravity in another way, by placing the stone on a scale, we only transpose it as the calculation of a weight. This determination of the stone may be very precise, but it is still a number, while, in the meantime, gravity has escaped us”.⁶¹

This quotation reveals the problems of musicology in general and musical analysis in particular, which mimesis has brought to light. With the analysis, we continue to use the already analysed principle of sufficient reason, which, as Schopenhauer says, does not work for art as such. To “analyse” is synonymous with “to reason”; it is to explain things on the basis of representations obtained by dissecting the piece into parts, into constituent elements. This is possible on the basis of a material support that can be used as a reference for all kinds of manipulation. But since music is the continuity of a series of coordinated movements that interact - especially those that produce the sound vibrations we are listening to - nothing allows us to consider as music the isolated material, frozen on paper, extracted from the movement that gives birth to it.

“That's why it doesn't matter what we would call in a more modern language material (material in the double sense: the material in which the instrument

⁶⁰See here some moments of the reconstruction process of *Threnody* from K. Penderecki, *Casa de Cultura de Londrina*, Brazil, 2010 :

www.youtube.com/watch?v=AaDP3j5H9hc

www.youtube.com/watch?v=AaDP3j5H9hc www.youtube.com/watch?v=UMaM_MBDIgE www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kesQ4IdmDc

⁶¹La pierre pèse, et manifeste ainsi sa lourdeur. Mais pendant que cette pesanteur vient à nous, elle refuse en même temps toute intrusion en elle. Si nous essayons pourtant d'y pénétrer, en cassant le roc, ses morceaux brisés ne montrent jamais quelque chose d'interne qui se serait ouverte à nos yeux. La pierre s'est aussitôt retirée en ses morceaux, dans la même pesanteur sourde et massive. Si nous tenons de saisir cette pesanteur par un autre moyen, en plaçant la pierre sur une balance, nous ne faisons entrer la pesanteur que dans le calcul d'un poids. Cette détermination de la pierre peut être très exacte, mais elle reste un chiffre, et la pesanteur nous a échappé. »

Martin HEIDEGGER, « L'origine de l'œuvre d'art », *art. cit.*, p. 5

For all these reasons, Musical Heuristics tries to fill the void produced by the inexistence of a discipline that tries to approach music from music itself. It is not its purpose to enter into conflict, but to complement musicological analyses. This is the deep sense of proposing creative mimesis in the reconstruction of works. It is an indispensable collaboration with musicological analyses, which allows two parallel apprehensions, irreducibly different but totally complementary to the musical: on the one hand, music as a lived experience, realized, completed; on the other, music as an act that is realized at this moment, as *work in progress*. For the traditional musicological vision, it is possible to dissociate the analysis from the feeling that the work produces in us. This mediation is at the origin of the related notions of reflection, observation and analysis. For Music Heuristics, the separation between the analysis of the work and the feeling is only theoretical: both are in an inseparable interaction.

CONCLUSION

Starting from mimesis, Aristotle's legacy has allowed us to build a passage between hermeneutics and heuristics, using the interpretation of texts as the epistemological foundation of realization. Thanks to the Stagirite we believe we have reached an ideal of unity, absolutely essential in art, by which the theoretical knowledge is nothing more than a preparation to action, to the realization of the principles enunciated as hypothesis.

May our contribution serve to understand the artist and art in its deepest sense?

⁶²« C'est pourquoi peu importe ce que nous appellerions dans une langue plus moderne le matériau (le matériau entendu au sens double : le matériau sur lequel travaille l'instrument et le matériau de l'instrument lui-même), peu importe le matériau puisque seul importe le mouvement. »

Ghislain HIS / Jean LÉVÈQUE, « La fabrique du visible – La fiction provoque l'action », ("The making of the visible - Fiction provokes action") in *Fiction théorique, cahiers thématiques de l'École d'Architecture et du Paysage de Lille (Theoretical Fiction, Thematic Notebooks of the Lille School of Architecture and Landscape)*, Lille, 2005, p. 72.